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FIXING RE-SALE PRICES.
The Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company v. Cream of Wheat
Company, 224 Fed. 566.
This decision handed down by Judge Hough of the Federal Dis-
trict Court may be considered interesting as the first that has come
to public notice, in which the second section of the Clayton Act has
been construed, and as another step in the effort of large manufac-
turers to control the career of their products after they have left the
producers' hands. The Cereal Company had published a sales
scheme in which they reserved the right to refuse to sell to any one
who would not abide by such requests as they should make. There
was no contract for a fixed price, but, taken with the history of
their dealing with plaintiff, the scheme meant, in the words of the
Court, "Keep up the retail price or we will stop supplying you, if
we think such stoppage profitable." The plaintiff, the owner and
operator of a large number of "chain stores," brought suit to compel
the defendant to supply them with carload lots at wholesale rates,
claiming that a refusal would be a violation of Sec. 2 of the Clayton
act. This section makes it unlawful to "Directly or indirectly dis-
criminate in price between different purchasers-where the effect is
to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly,"
but it does not forbid discrimination on account of quantity, or
quality, etc., and does not prevent "persons engaged in selling goods,
wares and merchandise in commerce from selecting their own cus-
tomers in bona fide transactions and not in restraint of trade." It
may be noted that the Sherman law was not brought into the case
by either counsel or the court.
The court held that the plan of the defendant was not such price
discrimination as to substantially lessen competition, as it was at
most a mere refusal to deal in an article that was not a necessity
or even a staple article of trade. In the following quotation the
opinion is expressed that Sec. 2 does not apply to defendant at all.
"Sec. 2 plainly identifies the lessening of competition with restraint
of trade (cf. the body of the Section with the last exception), but
price discrimination is only forbidden when it substantially lessens
competition. Construing the whole section together, the last excep-
tion reads that a vendor may select his own bona fide customers
providing the effects of such selection is not to substantially and
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unreasonably restrain trade. How it can be called substantial and
unreasonable restraint of trade to refuse to deal with a man who
avowedly is to use his dealings to injure the vendor, when said
vendor makes himself only such an advertisement-begotten article
as Cream of Wheat, whose fancy name needs the nursing of care-
fully handled cereals to maintain an output of trifling moment in the
food market-is beyond my comprehension."
The Court adds that such a construction as the plaintiffs desire
would cause the law so to operate as to confiscate property for a
private purpose and be unconstitutional. But this may be considered
as dictum.
Throughout the decision there is a marked tendency to view
with disfavor the practice of plaintiff in cutting rates, Judge Hough
considering that it injured other dealers without a compensating
benefit to the general public; and so strong is this tendency as to
suggest the question whether he would not have been willing to
enjoin plaintiffs for unfair competition. He says, "In short, it is
plaintiff and not defendant that pursues methods whose hardship
and injustice have often been judicially commented upon." This
view would seem rather extreme.'
More recently there has appeared a decision which seems at first
sight, at least, to conflict with Judge Hough's rule. - The case was
that of the United States v. Kellogg Toasted Corn Flake Co. et al.
2
The defendant owned a patent on the boxes in which their product
was marketed and printed notices on them that selling below ten
cents per package was an infringement of their patent right.' The
Court enjoined them from publishing this notice and also declared
that their sales plan was unlawful under the Sherman law, and
enjoined them also against requiring jobbers to make any agree-
ment for a fixed re-sale price and also "from suggesting to said
retailers, in writing or otherwise, that if they fail or refuse to
observe said fixed price they will be cut off from a further supply
of said product." The decree was given by the agreement of the
parties. The Cream of Wheat Company had sent out notices whose
effect was to suggest directly the very thing which the Court here
holds unlawful. It has been suggested, however, that there is no
irreconcilable conflict between the decision of the two cases. The
1 Our attention has been called to the fact that the Tea Co. has now
instituted a suit in the New York District Court to have the sales plan
of the Cream of Wheat Company declared illegal under the Sherman law.2United States Dist. Court, Eastern Dist. of Mich., Southern Div., Case
No. 5570.
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object of the Cream of Wheat case was to obtain an injunction
under Sections 2 and 16 of the Clayton Law and Judge Hough ex-
pressly ruled out any consideration of the Sherman Law, upon which
the Kellogg case was decided.
But Judge Hough's reasoning, it would seem, is contrary to the
decision in the latter case. He states that restraint of trade has the
same meaning in the Clayton Act as in the Sherman Act, and at some
length gives as his opinion that the plan of the Cream of Wheat
Company was not an unreasonable restraint. It has been noted
above that he was inclined to look at the operation of price cutters
unfavorably. Since corn flakes and cream of wheat occupy practi-
cally the same position in the food market, if the plan of selling
the latter is not an unreasonable restraint, the same plan of selling
the former would not be unlawful under either the Clayton or the
Sherman Act. Besides, Judge Hough expressed the belief that
Congress had no power under the Constitution to pass a law author-
izing the Court to issue an injunction compelling a producer to sup-
ply a retailer with his product. It would seem that this view would
be applicable to the decree in the Kellogg case. Do not the follow-
ing words apply equally to either company and to either law? "If
defendant's actual scheme of interstate business is unlawful, the
United States certainly, and now perhaps an individual plaintiff,
can put it out of business, but neither the nation nor any individual
can take away its property with or without compensation for the
private use of any one."
As matters stand neither case can be taken directly to the Su-
preme Court and it may be years before this precise point will be
ruled upon; meanwhile, the question of price fixing is one that
commands a good deal of interest. It seems that an ex-
press contract between the manufacturer of an unpatented
article and the wholesaler fixing the re-sale price is invalid.3 Also
the publisher of a copyrighted book cannot by a notice in the book
establish a minimum price and treat as an infringement of the copy-
right a sale below that price.4 A producer of a patented article
cannot enforce under his patent right a fixed re-sale price, by print-
ing on the package containing the article a notice that selling below
such price is an infringement, and also adding that the notice is a
condition of the contract of sale to the retailer and that all rights
"Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park Co., 220 U. S. 373.4Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U. S. 339.
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revert to the patentee on the breach of the condition.5 The ground
of the decision was that with the sale the rights granted by the
patent laws were exhausted and the article passed beyond the patent
monopoly. The same conclusion was reached where in a similar
notice it was provided that the title should remain in the manufac-
turer until the expiration of the patent having the longest time to
run and then to go to the purchaser only if all conditions had been
complied with, the Court holding that as a sale was the ultimate
purpose the temporary reservation of title was not sufficient to take
the case out of the rule laid down in the Bauer case above.0 On the
other hand, the patentee may assign his exclusive right to make the
article on condition that the assignee will maintain a certain price.7
These cases would seem to make an agreement for a certain
minimum price on patented articles unlawful, but in a recent deci-
sion Judge Geiger drew a distinction between such agreements and
the circumstances governed by the Bauer case, limiting the latter to
cases where the reservation of rights under the patent laws was
attempted by a notice and holding good the same reservation ob-
tained by an express contract.8 It is regrettable that the learned
Judge did not express more clearly the reasons for the distinction.
As the Miles case above decided that similar contracts regarding
unpatented articles were void, it would seem that the basis of the
decision must be s6me right derived from the fact that the article
was patented. Yet if a condition in the sale to the retailer fixing the
re-sale price expressed in the form of a notice cannot be upheld upon
this right, it is not clear how a contract to the same effect can be
based upon it. A case similar to this one was differently decided by
judge Hollister, who held that as the sale took, the article out of
the patent monopoly a contract fixing a re-sale price was void under
the rule in the Miles case.9 The learned Judge also drew a distinc-
tion between an actual sale of the article and an assignment of the
exclusive right to sell granted by the patent law. It is conceived
that this is the distinction between this and the Bement v. Harrow
Company case above, where the exclusive right to make was as-
signed.
5Bauer v. O'Donnell, 229 U. S. 1. United States v. Kellogg Co., 222
Fed. '725. The latter case is the same as the one commented upon above.
The opinion is on a motion to strike out and is concerned only with the
rights under the patent laws.
Victor Co. v. Straus, 222 Fed 524.7Bement v. Harrow Co., 186 U. S. 70.
SAmerican Graphophone Co. v. Boston Store, 225 Fed. 785
Ford Motor Car Co. v. Union Motor Sales Co., 225 Fed. 373.
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The owners of various patents which are used in the manufac-
ture of one article, but which are complementary to each other, and
are upon devices to be used in different portions of the process of
manufacture may legally combine to protect and obtain the benefit
of their patents. United States v. United Shoe Machinery Company,
222 Fed. 349. But this right is to combine only for the protection
of the patents. If they are on devices which are designed to per-
form the same service, and if the effect of the combination is more
than protection of the patents and extends to monopoly through
unreasonable restraint of trade, flowing directly from the agreement,
it constitutes a conspiracy in restraint of trade and is illegal. Stand-
ard Sanitary Manufacturing Co. v. United States, 226 U. S. 20.
United States v. Motion Picture Patents Company, 225 Fed. 800.
There is a bill before Congress making it a felony to cut prices
and one to establish the legality of fixing prices. Bills introduced
into the Legislatures of New York and other states forbid the fixing
of a re-sale price. Several concerns with large resources have taken
up the practice of distributing their goods on genuine consignment
contracts, keeping the entire title in themselves until the sale to the
consumer is made. This ties up much capital and is possible only to
large firms.
The Cream of Wheat case may point out another possible way
in which prices may be to some extent legally regulated. Because
an agreement to fix prices is illegal, it does not necessarily follow
that there are not lawful means by which the same object may not be
partially, at least, enforced. Under this decision a producer may
by a careful selection of customers obtain as his distributing agent'
only men who will voluntarily accede to the wishes of the producer.
The distinction between an agreement to sell above a certain mini-
mum price and the refusal to deal with those who are unwilling to
do so, may seem over nice in view of the fact that retailers may be
virtually compelled by the demands of their customers to keep cer-
tain goods in stock. This case, however, is limited in its reasoning
to such commodities as Cream of Wheat, which are not "necessities
of life, or even a staple article of trade," leaving undecided whether
in regard to the more necessary articles the same method of business
would be lawful or not. It may be that the Court considered this
to be the test whereby it could be determined whether or not the
case fell within the act. This view, of course, depends upon whether
the Kellogg case above is followed or not. If under that case such
restraints of trade are unreasonable this plan could not be worked.
But if Judge Hough is upheld in his opinion either that such
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methods are legitimate, or that a law compelling the producer to
supply a retailer is unconstitutional, this plan may be feasible.
Price cutters argue that they benefit the community by supplying
goods at low prices. Their opponents urge that the benefits of such
methods of competition are limited and temporary; that their theory
is that on which the Sherman law was passed; to prevent cheap
selling where there is competition, and dear where there is none.
Whatever may be the final solution, the question is one that concerns
the entire public, the producers, the retailer and the consumer, not
only those who are so situated as to take advantage of cut prices,
but those who cannot do so. It is not against public policy to allow
a reasonable profit, but it is against public policy to allow an unrea-
sonable and monopolistic profit or to depress sales, so as to hamper
legitimate business or to create a cut-throat competition.
S. McK.
(Since the above note was written Judge Lacombe for the Fed-
eral Circuit Court of Appeals, on November 10th, sustained the
decision of Judge Hough in the Cream of Wheat case. Attention is
called to the fact that the sales of the company amount to only one
per cent of the total sales of the wheat in question, and to the "ele-
mentary law" that a trader may select his own customers.-Ed.)
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